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Abstract: It is well known that pay-as-you-go retirement programs reduce steady-state 
welfare and the capital stock in dynamically efficient OLG economies. The common two-
period OLG model obscures, however, the dependence of these effects on the ages at 
which taxes are paid and benefits are received. Program changes that shift taxes to older 
workers or benefits to younger retirees have effects similar to reductions in program size, 
yielding steady-state welfare gains and increases in capital accumulation while imposing 
transition costs on current generations. This analysis has policy implications for both tax 
and benefit timing.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The study of two-period OLG models has yielded important insights into the 
welfare effects of pay-as-you-go retirement programs in dynamically efficient economies. 
A pay-as-you-go program offers windfall gains during its start-up phase, but lowers 
steady-state utility because its steady-state rate of return equals the economy’s growth 
rate, which, under dynamic efficiency, is lower than the marginal product of capital. 
Shutting down or scaling back the program allows future generations to earn higher 
returns, but imposes transition costs on current generations who have paid into the 
program but have not yet received full benefits. The future generations’ gains and the 
transition costs are equal in present value. It is well known that these results extend to 
continuous-time and multi-period OLG models. 
I show, however, that the two-period model fails to capture the role of one 
important factor. The welfare effects of a pay-as-you-go program depend upon its life-
cycle timing – the average ages at which each cohort pays taxes and receives benefits. In 
the two-period model, taxes must be paid in “period one” and benefits must be received 
in “period two.” In contrast, actual programs have flexibility in the allocation of taxes 
  1within the working lifetime and benefits within the retirement years. I show that the 
program’s steady-state welfare loss is smaller when taxes are paid at later ages or benefits 
are received at earlier ages. 
These effects arise because the pay-as-you-go program’s rate-of-return shortfall is 
less harmful to each cohort when compounded over a shorter or later time period. 
Shifting taxes to older ages or benefits to younger ages therefore aids future generations 
in a manner similar to reducing the size of the pay-as-you-go program. Like a reduction 
in program size, though, such a timing shift imposes a transition cost on current 
generations, equal in present value to future generations’ gains. Specifically, shifting 
taxes to older workers boosts lifetime taxes for some of the cohorts working at the time of 
implementation, while shifting benefits to younger retirees reduces lifetime benefits for 
some of the cohorts retired at that time.  
In a simple calibration of the U.S. Social Security program, a payroll tax 
exemption during the first 10 years of working life (with a revenue-neutral tax increase 
on older workers) reduces the program’s steady-state welfare loss by about one-sixth. 
This policy raises lifetime taxes for most of the cohorts working at the time of 
implementation. Policy changes that raise benefits for younger retirees (with a budget-
neutral benefit reduction for older retirees) also generate steady-state welfare gains and 
transition costs, but of smaller magnitudes.  
In section II, I review the familiar analysis of pay-as-you-go retirement programs 
in two-period OLG models. In section III, I explain the role of tax and benefit timing in a 
continuous-time OLG model under the assumption that all taxes are paid at a single age 
and all benefits received at a single age. In section IV, I show that these results generalize 
  2to the more realistic case in which taxes and benefits are paid at multiple ages. I examine 
the implications for tax timing in section V and those for benefit timing in section VI. 
Section VII concludes.  
II. REVIEW OF TWO-PERIOD MODELS 
  I begin by reviewing the basic properties of pay-as-you-go retirement programs in 
the familiar two-period OLG model. Technology is linear, implying fixed factor prices, 
and labor supply is inelastic. In each period t, the number of workers is   and the per-
worker wage is  . The gross-of-principal one-period marginal product of capital is R. I 
assume R > NG, so that the economy is dynamically efficient.  
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Consider a simple pay-as-you-go retirement program. In period t, each of the 
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1 The lifetime present-value net burden on each period-t worker is 
(1)  .  {} ) / ( 1 R NG G
t − τ
The money’s worth ratio, the present value of benefits divided by the present value of 
taxes, equals (NG/R). 
Since the present value (1) would equal zero if R equaled NG, the program’s 
internal rate of return is NG, the economy’s growth rate.
2 With R > NG, the continued 
operation of the pay-as-you-go program places a burden on each future generation.
3 The 
period-t closed-group liability is the period-t present value of the aggregate burden that 
                                                           
1 As befits a pure pay-as-you-go program, budget balance is assumed to hold in each period. This 
assumption rules out the temporary surpluses and deficits often posted by (essentially) pay-as-you-go 
programs, such as the post-1983 U.S. Social Security surpluses. 
2 This result was derived by Samuelson (1958) and Aaron (1966). Also, see Lindbeck and Persson (2003, 
79), Feldstein and Liebman (2002, 2257-2258), Geanakoplos, Mitchell and Zeldes (1999, 84), and 
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987, 147-148). 
  3continuation imposes on period-t workers and later generations (equivalently, their gain 
from ending the program). Multiplying  { } ) / ( 1 R NG G
s − τ , the burden on each period-s 
worker, by cohort size   and discount factor 
s N
s t R
− and summing across s from t to 
infinity yields, 
(2)  .  ()
t
t NG CGL τ =
Although abruptly ending the program at the beginning of period t benefits 
period-t workers and later generations, it imposes a “transition cost” on the period-t 
retirees, who have already paid taxes, but lose benefits of ( )
t NG τ . The transition cost is 
equal to CGLt, the present value of future generations’ gains. This present-value equality 
also applies to the initial creation of the program – the present value of the program’s 
burden on future generations equal the start-up gains of the initial retirees, who receive 
benefits without paying taxes. It can be shown that the equality also applies to gradual 
and phased-in changes.
4
As discussed by Lindbeck and Persson (2003, 82), Kotlikoff (2002, 1878-1886) 
and Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987, 148), the pay-as-you-go program also depresses 
capital accumulation. With endogenous factor prices, the reduction in the capital stock 
results in lower wages and a higher marginal product of capital.  
It is well known that the two-period model’s basic insights extend to continuous-
time models: the program’s steady-state return equals the economy’s growth rate, the 
program lowers steady-state welfare (under dynamic efficiency), and ending the program 
                                                                                                                                                                             
3 In contrast, if R < NG (the economy is dynamically inefficient), the pay-as-you-go retirement program 
increases all generations’ wellbeing. Auerbach, Mankiw, Summers and Zeldes (1989) provide evidence, 
though, that the U.S. economy is dynamically efficient. 
4 For further discussion, see Lindbeck and Persson (2003, 80-81), Kotlikoff (2002, 1881-1882), Feldstein 
and Leibman (2002, 2258-2259), and Geanakopolis, Mitchell and Zeldes (1999, 86-87).  
  4imposes a transition cost on current generations equal to the closed-group liability. I now 
show, however, that continuous-time models also provide an important role for life-cycle 
timing effects that are suppressed in the two-period model. 
III. TWO-AGE PROGRAMS IN CONTINUOUS TIME 
I examine a continuous-time overlapping-generations economy with linear 
technology. At date t,   people begin economic life, the age-a population is , and 
total population is , where 
nt e










 and L is the length of economic life. At date 
t, the per-capita wage equals  and national labor income equals  . The marginal 
product of capital is r > n+g, so the economy is dynamically efficient. 
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Consider a simple “two-age” pay-as-you-go retirement program that collects taxes 
solely at age   and pays benefits solely at age . Transfers are equal to a fixed 
fraction τ of national labor income. At date t, each of the  individuals aged  pays 
tax of  and each of the  individuals aged  receives benefit  . 
Each individual entering the economy at date s then faces a net lifetime burden with a 
date-s present value of  , where 
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A. Steady State Effects of Tax and Benefit Timing 
As in the two-period model, the steady-state burden is proportional to the 
program’s size τ and is increasing in the rate-of-return shortfall r-n-g. But, the burden is 
also greater if the tax age is lower and the benefit age  is higher. These tax and 
benefit timing effects, which are the focus of this paper, are not captured by the two-
T A B A
  5period model, in which tax payment and benefit receipt must occur in “period one” and 
“period two,” respectively. 
Specifically, the money’s worth ratio, the present-value ratio of benefits to taxes, 
is  . This ratio has a straightforward interpretation. If an individual were 
required to invest in an asset paying n+g rather than the market return r for an interval of 
length , this would be ratio of the present value of the payout to the present value 
of the initial investment outlay. The same effects arise when an individual participates in 
a pay-as-you-go program with return n+g. In either context, a rate-of-return shortfall is 
more harmful when compounded over a longer interval.  
) )( ( T B A A r g n e
− − +
T B A A −
To be more concrete, set n+g equal to .03 (reflecting 1 percent population growth 
and 2 percent productivity growth) and r equal to .05 (a conservative estimate of the 
marginal product of capital). Investing at 3 percent rather than 5 percent over a one-year 
interval is only slightly harmful; the money’s worth ratio equals  or .98, so only 2 
percent of the investment is lost due to the below-market return. But, investing at such 
returns over a 10-year interval is considerably more harmful; the money’s worth ratio 
equals  or .82 and the loss is 18 percent. Over a 30-year period, the harm is much 
greater, with a money’s worth ratio of  or .55 and a 45 percent loss. 
02 . − e
2 . − e
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A pay-as-you-go program imposes similarly small steady-state welfare losses if 
there is only a one-year gap between taxes and benefits; if, say, Social Security taxes 
were paid at age 50 and benefits received at age 51, there would be little loss from the 
below-market returns. The losses are much greater if taxes are paid at age 40 and benefits 
are received at age 70. 
  6Expression (3) also reveals that, holding fixed the interval  T B A A −  and the 
program size τ, the absolute burden is smaller if the tax and benefit ages are later.  
Delaying both the tax and the benefit ages by one year reduces each present value by 2 
percent, which leaves the money’s worth ratio unchanged, but reduces the size of the net 
burden by 2 percent. The beginning-of-life present value of the burden is therefore 2 
percent smaller if taxes are paid at age 41 and benefits received at age 51 than if taxes are 
paid at age 40 and benefits are received at age 50. This result can also be understood by 
considering the investment analogy. The beginning-of-life present value burden of a 
required below-market investment depends upon the beginning-of-life present value of 
the amount invested. In this case, delaying each individual’s tax by one year while 
holding τ fixed reduces the beginning-of-life present value of the tax by 2 percent. The 
one-year delay raises the size of the tax payment by 3 percent (since revenue remains a 
fixed fraction τ of national labor income, which grows 3 percent each year); the present 
value of the tax then falls by 2 percent because it is discounted an additional 5 percent.  
B. Present-Value Equality Continues to Hold  
As is well known, the present-value equality also holds in continuous-time 
models. In this two-age case, abruptly shutting down the program imposes a transition 
cost on individuals aged between  and , who are denied their benefit despite having 
paid their tax. Of course, individuals younger than   gain (in the same manner as future 
generations), so their gains must be subtracted to obtain the net transition cost on current 
generations. As shown in section A of the appendix, the closed-group liability (the 
welfare gain to future generations) and the net transition cost are both equal to 
T A B A
T A





− + ) (  for a date-t shutdown. It can be shown that, as before, the equality 
also holds for gradual and phased-in changes.  
The application of the present-value equality to the two-age program makes 
intuitive sense. As discussed above, if there is only a one-year gap between the tax and 
benefit ages, the gains to future generations from a shutdown are small because they are 
spared only one year of below-market returns. It can readily be seen that the transition 
cost on current generations is then also small, since only one annual cohort suffers such a 
cost. Conversely, if the tax and benefit ages are 30 years apart, abolition offers large 
gains to future generations who are spared 30 years of below-market returns. But, the 
transition cost is also large because 30 annual cohorts are harmed. 
As in the two-period model, the present-value equality also applies to program 
start-up; the present value of the program’s burden on future generations equal the start-
up gains of the initial cohorts who receive benefits without paying taxes. The burden 
imposed on future generations by a program that collects taxes at age 50 and pays 
benefits at age 51 is small; the start-up bonus offered by its abrupt introduction is also 
small, because only those aged between 50 and 51 receive benefits without paying taxes. 
For a program that collects taxes at age 40 and pays benefits at age 70, the future burden 
is large; the start-up bonus is also large, with everyone aged between 40 and 70 receiving 
benefits without having paid taxes.  
As discussed above, holding  T B A A −  fixed, delaying both ages reduces the 
program’s burden on future generations and hence their gains from its abolition. It can 
readily be seen that such a delay also reduces the net transition cost on current 
generations. As previously noted, cohorts younger than  gain from abolition; if   is  T A T A
  8higher, then a larger number of current cohorts have such gains. Because their gains are 
subtracted in computing the net transition cost on current generations, that cost is smaller.  
The present-value equality has another important implication. Because the 
equality holds for any pair of tax and benefit ages, it also holds for any change from one 
pair to another. By raising the tax age or lowering the benefit age, policymakers can 
reduce the program’s steady state burden without reducing its size. But, they cannot 
avoid the transition cost. Abruptly raising the tax age from 40 to 50 imposes a transition 
cost on workers then aged between 40 and 50; they are taxed again at age 50 under the 
new rules, after having been taxed at age 40 under the old rules. Abruptly lowering the 
benefit age from, say, 70 to 60 imposes a transition cost on retirees then aged between 60 
and 70; they were too young to receive benefits under the old rules, but are too old to 
receive benefits under the new rules. As before, the transition cost also arises from 
gradual and phased-in changes. As in the two-period model, there is no free lunch. 
IV. GENERAL CASE 
The above analysis assumes that taxes are paid at a single age and benefits are 
received at another single age. I now show that the conclusions also apply to programs 
that collect taxes and pay benefits at a variety of ages.
5  
Assume that, at each date t, each of the   individuals aged a pays   
or receives  , subject to the budget constraint 
) ( a t n e
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5 Section B of the appendix confirms that the present-value equality holds in this general case. 
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Taking a first-order Taylor approximation to the logs of PVT and PVB with 
respect to r, evaluated at r equal to n+g, and using the budget constraint yields  
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. (From the budget constraint, 
the denominators of the   and   expressions both equal T A B A P τ ). 
Taking the exponential of (5) and substituting into (4) yields an expression 
identical to (3). Up to a Taylor approximation error, the analysis is unchanged from the 
two-age case, except that   and  are now weighted average ages of tax payment and 
benefit receipt rather than the single ages previously considered.  
T A B A
In the weighted averages that define   and  , each age is weighted by the 
present value of taxes or benefits at that age, using the discount rate n+g (the value 
around which the Taylor approximation is taken). These weighted averages are 
algebraically identical to the bond duration measure of Macaulay (1938, 48-50), which is 
prominent in the bond pricing literature. Macaulay duration is a weighted average of the 
time remaining until a bond’s future payments, with weights given by the present value 
of each payment. The economic interpretation is the same in both contexts; just as a 
T A B A
                                                           
6 In the two-age case, T(a) is   at   and zero elsewhere while B(a) is   at  and 
zero elsewhere.  
T A g n Pe
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  10bond’s duration governs the sensitivity of its present value (price) to the interest rate, so 
these weighted average ages govern the sensitivity of the present values PVT and PVB to 
the discount rate r.  
  To obtain more specific results and to avoid reliance on a Taylor approximation, I 
calibrate a stylized representation of the U.S. Social Security old-age and survivor (but 
not disability) program, as further detailed in section C of the appendix. I continue to set 
n to .01, g to .02, and r to .05. I assume that individuals work from economic ages 0 to X 
and are retired from economic ages X to L. I set X equal to 42 and L equal to 60, 
corresponding to work from biological ages 20 to 62 and retirement from biological ages 
62 to 80. The population parameter P is then 45.1. 
Under the benchmark policy, the program is financed by an age-uniform payroll 
tax of rate τ, so the timing of tax payments matches the timing of wages. I fit a quadratic 
cross-sectional age-earnings profile to recent data. Also, under the benchmark policy, 
benefits are paid from ages X to L and remain unchanged in real terms for each cohort 
throughout retirement.  
In this benchmark case, PVT equals 29.89τ and PVB equals 16.62τ. These values 
are the same as those in a two-age program with  equal to 20.6 (roughly the midpoint 
of working life) and   equal to 49.9 (close to the midpoint of the retirement period). 
The money’s worth ratio is .556. The closed-group liability is 14.7 times annual benefit 
payments, or about $6.4 trillion in 2005.  
T A
B A
Starting from the benchmark policy, I first examine reforms that alter the timing 
of taxes and then turn to reforms that change the timing of benefits.  
 
  11V. TAX TIMING CHANGES 
Consider a revenue-neutral replacement of the age-uniform payroll tax with a 
young-worker exemption policy. As detailed in section D of the appendix, such a policy 
imposes no tax on the earnings of workers below economic age Y and maintains revenue 
neutrality by taxing earnings from ages Y through X at a rate higher than τ. Figure 1 
depicts the steady-state tax burden PVT for exemption ages from zero (the benchmark 
policy) to 42 (the extreme policy in which each worker pays her lifetime taxes in a single 
payment right before retirement). As the exemption age rises, the lifetime present value 
of the tax burden falls, in accordance with the above analysis.  
FIGURE 1
Present Value of Taxes with Young-Worker Exemption
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Consider Y equal to 10, so that workers are exempt from taxes during the first 10 
years of working life (biological ages 20 through 30), with a revenue-neutral increase in 
the tax rate on older workers to 1.21τ. Then, PVT is reduced from 29.89τ to 27.72τ, 
  12which is equivalent to raising  from 20.6 to 24.4 in a two-age program. Since PVB still 
equals 16.62τ, the net lifetime loss from the pay-as-you-go system falls from 13.27τ to 
11.10τ, a reduction of more than 16 percent. In other words, the steady-state gain from 
this young-worker exemption is equal to that attained by scaling back the system by one-
sixth across the board. The reduction in the 2005 closed-group liability is about $1.0 
trillion. 
T A
In accord with the present-value equality, however, the gain to future generations 
is accompanied by a transition cost of the same size on current generations. If exempting 
workers from taxes during their first 10 working years yields the same future gains as 
shrinking the program by one-sixth, then it must impose the same aggregate transition 
costs on current generations. The costs are allocated differently; under the young-worker 
exemption, the cost is borne solely by current workers, rather than current retirees.  
FIGURE 2
Individuals' Net Losses from Young-Worker Exemptions
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  13Figure 2 plots the present-value loss (negative if gain) borne by each member of 
the various working cohorts from the abrupt introduction of young-worker exemptions 
with exemption ages of 5, 10, 15, and 20. For Y equal to 10, workers aged 0 through 4.0 
are net winners and older workers are net losers. In general, the loss is greatest for 
workers around the exemption age, who obtain no gain from the exemption and who have 
the longest exposure to the higher rate.  
By assuming particular utility and production functions (as detailed in section E 
of the appendix), it is possible to compute the effects on capital accumulation. For this 
purpose, I set τ equal to .056, the 2005 ratio of old-age and survivor benefits to national 
labor income. Figure 3 plots the increases in the steady-state capital stock resulting from 
young-worker exemptions for ages 0 through 42. For comparison, the chart shows the 8.0 
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FIGURE 3 
Increase in Steady-State Capital Stock from Young-Worker Exemption
Increase in Steady-State Capital Stock from Abolition of Pay-As-You-Go Program
 
  14The relative effects of different policies are virtually unchanged from the partial-
equilibrium framework. For example, an exemption age of 10 increases the steady-state 
capital stock by 1.2 percent, which is 15 percent of the increase attained from abolition of 
the program; recall that this policy yielded 16 percent of the partial-equilibrium steady-
state welfare gains offered by abolition.  
The capital-accumulation effects follow straightforwardly from the analysis of 
Seidman and Lewis (2003), who show that any revenue-neutral shift of the tax burden 
from young to old increases the steady-state capital stock. As they note, a similar point 
has been made by authors studying the choice between consumption and wage taxation, 
including Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987, 58-60) and Summers (1981). The present 
analysis applies this general insight to payroll taxation, thereby linking the analysis to the 
literature on pay-as-you-go retirement programs and permitting an extension to benefit 
timing. This analysis, like much of the pay-as-you-go literature, emphasizes the partial-
equilibrium welfare effects, with less attention to the capital-accumulation effects 
emphasized by Seidman and Lewis. This difference in emphasis is largely a matter of 
taste, since the two effects are inextricably linked. 
Hubbard and Judd (1987) present a separate argument for a young-worker payroll 
tax exemption based on borrowing restrictions. (Also, see Hurst and Willen (2004)). 
Hubbard and Judd assume a pre-funded Social Security system that pays the market 
return r. They note that, if young workers face binding borrowing restrictions, their 
shadow interest rates exceed r and it is then desirable to delay tax payments. In contrast, 
the present analysis assumes no borrowing restrictions, so that workers’ shadow interest 
rate equals r, but considers a pay-as-you-go system that pays rate of return n+g < r. If 
  15these complementary analyses are combined, the steady-state welfare gain from a young 
worker exemption is even larger, as borrowing restrictions push workers’ shadow rate 
above r while the pay-as-you-go system offers a return, n+g, lower than r. 
VI. CHANGES IN BENEFIT TIMING 
The analysis in the preceding section considered the steady-state gains and 
transition costs associated with delaying tax payments. As discussed earlier, qualitatively 
similar effects can be achieved by accelerating benefit receipt. Although benefit timing 
changes generally have smaller effects than tax timing changes, the effects can still be 
significant. I consider three policies to alter benefit timing, with full details in section F 
of the appendix. 
The easiest way to compare the effects of tax and benefit timing changes is to 
consider the (unrealistic) policy that is analytically parallel to the young-worker 
exemption; an old-retiree cutoff that eliminates benefits for retirees above age J with a 
budget-neutral benefit increase for younger retirees. The old-retiree cutoff has much 
smaller effects than the young-worker exemption. For example, the extreme policy of 
paying all lifetime benefits at the onset of retirement (J equal to 42) raises PVB only from 
16.62τ to 19.48τ, a gain of 2.86τ; the corresponding extreme policy of collecting all 
lifetime taxes at that same age (Y equal to 42) lowers PVT from 29.89τ to 19.48τ, a gain 
of 10.41τ, over three times larger.
7 Similarly, denying benefits during the second half of 
retirement (J equal to 51) raises PVB by 1.28τ, while eliminating taxes during the first 
half of working life (Y equal to 21) lowers PVT by 5.25τ. 
                                                           
7 The combination of the two extreme policies equates PVB to PVT at 19.48τ, eliminating the steady-state 
welfare loss. Indeed, this combination shuts down the program, since there are no real effects from paying 
taxes that are immediately and fully refunded in the form of benefits.   
  16The smaller impact of benefit timing changes is easily explained. Raising   by 
one year and lowering   by one year have the same proportional effects, reducing PVT 
by 2 percent and increasing PVB by 2 percent. But, since PVT is almost twice as large as 
PVB under the benchmark policy, the tax change has the larger absolute effect. Also, 
because working life is longer than retirement (here, 42 versus 18 years), the tax changes 
in the above comparisons alter   by more than the benefit changes alter  . For 
example, the extreme tax timing policy raises   by 21.6 years, from 20.4 to 42, while 
the extreme benefit timing policy lowers   by only 7.9 years, from 49.9 to 42.  
T A
B A
T A B A
T A
B A
I next consider changes in the benefit growth rate during retirement. Under the 
benchmark policy (as in the actual Social Security system), each individual’s real benefits 
remain constant throughout retirement. A budget-neutral change that hikes initial benefits 
but then lets benefits fall 4 percent per year throughout retirement raises PVB from 
16.62τ to 16.96τ. Conversely, a budget-neutral change that reduces initial benefits and 
then lets them rise 4 percent per year lowers PVB to 16.27τ. 
Finally, I consider a policy parameter that has been changed in past Social 
Security reforms, the benefit eligibility age. Relative to leaving the program unchanged, 
an eligibility-age increase obviously shrinks the program and reduces the steady-state 
welfare loss. Because the eligibility-age increase delays benefit receipt, however, it 
reduces the steady-state burden by less than a budget-equivalent across-the-board benefit 
reduction.  
To examine this issue, consider a budget-neutral eligibility-age increase in which 
benefits are delayed until V > X and are increased for older retirees. As shown in Figure 
4, denying benefits during the first three years of retirement (V equal to 45) lowers PVB 
  17from 16.62τ to 16.03τ. Although changes in benefit timing have smaller impacts than 
changes in tax timing, the effects can still be significant. In 2005, a three-year eligibility-
age increase would result in a present-value aggregate loss for future generations of 
almost $300 billion, compared to across-the-board cuts that lowered aggregate benefits 
by the same amount. 
FIGURE 4
Present Value of Benefits, Under Various Eligibility Ages
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This analysis has assumed known lifetimes. In a world with uncertain lifetimes 
and imperfect annuitization, the policies considered in this section, particularly the old-
retiree cutoff, would harm individuals who enjoy unexpectedly long lifetimes. Such 
effects would have to be considered in a more complete analysis.
8 Like the smaller 
impact of benefit timing changes, these effects may suggest that tax timing changes are of 
greater policy relevance.  
                                                           
8 Feldstein (1990) considers the choice of benefit growth rates in a four-period OLG model, analyzing both 
the effects considered here and the effects of uncertain lifetimes and imperfect annuitization.  
  18VII. CONCLUSION 
In a continuous-time OLG model, a pay-as-you-go retirement program’s steady-
state welfare loss is higher when taxes are paid earlier or benefits are received later. The 
larger loss arises because the pay-as-you-go program’s rate-of-return shortfall is more 
harmful to each cohort when compounded over a longer or earlier time period. Policy 
changes that exempt younger workers from payroll taxes (with a revenue-neutral tax 
increase on older workers) increase steady-state welfare, but impose transition costs on 
older workers when implemented. Policy changes that increase benefits for younger 
retirees (with a budget-neutral benefit cut for older retirees) have similar, but smaller, 
effects. Policy analyses of proposed changes in pay-as-you-go retirement programs 
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  20APPENDIX 
 
Section A: Closed-Group Liability and Transition Cost in Two-Age Model 
To obtain the date-t closed-group liability, multiply the burden on each date-s 
entrant from (3) by the number of such entrants   and the discount factor  and 
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Section B: Closed-Group Liability and Transition Cost in General Case 
To obtain the date-t closed group liability, apply discount factor  to the 
burden   on each of the   date-s entrants and integrate across s from t 
to infinity to obtain 
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  21The transition cost is computed as follows. The combined date-t present-value 
loss of the cohorts aged 0 through L as of date t equals 
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Since  from the budget constraint and 
, this expression can be rewritten as 
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Section C: Calibration of Social Security System 
An individual of age a (from 0 to X) at date t receives earnings 
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The Z(n+g,0,X) term in the denominator of the earnings function scales wages to keep the 
per-capita wage equal to  . So, 
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= τ  and PVT  then equals 
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τ .  
  22Using Social Security Administration worker and earnings data and Census 
population data for 2003, I constructed a proxy for per-capita earnings (number of 
workers multiplied by median earnings divided by population) for each five-year age 
cohort between ages 20 and 60 and for the two-year cohort aged 61 to 62. I regressed this 
proxy on a constant, the midpoint economic age of each group (treating biological age 20 
as economic age zero), and age squared and rescaled the coefficients to set the intercept 
to one, obtaining  equal to .2608 and   equal to -.00511.  1 w 2 w
The budget constraint then requires that   L g n X g n e e
g n
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Section D: Young-Worker Exemption 
The young-worker exemption taxes ages Y through X at rate 
) , , (
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Under this policy, T(a) equals zero for a less than Y and equals  




X Y g n Z





τ  for 
a from Y through X. Then, PVT equals 
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At date t, for each a between Y and X, each of   workers suffers a loss with 
present value 
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+ − + τ  from the higher tax rate. For 
each a between 0 and Y, each of   workers of age a suffers a loss with present value 
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+ − + τ  from the higher tax rate they will face after 
  23attaining age Y, but has a gain with present value 
) , 0 , (
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− + τ  from the 
exemption enjoyed until age Y.  
Section E: Equilibrium Capital Stock 
Letting K denote the capital stock divided by national labor income, the steady 
state values of K and r satisfy two conditions. First, 





K , where κ is the 
capital share in a Cobb-Douglas production function for gross-of-deprecation output and 
δ is the deprecation rate. Second, K equals the aggregate stock of national saving, which 
is the present value of future consumption minus the present value of future disposable 
non-capital income, 
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where K(a), C(a) and W(a) are capital holdings, consumption, and pretax labor income of 
each worker at age a. (Like B(a) and T(a), they are expressed as a fraction of the per-
capita wage when the individual is of economic age zero.) If the consumer maximizes 
, then  ∫
− L a da a C e
0 )) ( log(
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1
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λ λ ] . Setting κ to .35, δ 
to .04, and τ equal to .056, I solved backwards to find that a time preference rate λ of .018 
yields a capital stock consistent r equal to .05 under the age-uniform benchmark policy. 
(In 2005, old-age and survivor benefits were 5.6 percent of national labor income, 
defined as employee compensation plus two-thirds of proprietors’ income). I then 
computed the equilibrium values of K and r under program abolition and the young-
worker exemptions.  
Section F: Changes in Benefit Timing 
  24A budget-neutral old-retiree cutoff with cutoff age J sets B(a) equal to 
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A budget-neutral change that lets each cohort’s real benefit grow at rate q sets 
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A budget-neutral increase in the eligibility age to V sets B(a) equal to zero for a 
from X through V and equal to  L g n V g n e e
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